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Introduction 
     Change has been a dominant theme in Japanese grand strategy. In fact, the study of grand 
strategies from the Meiji to Heisei eras is in itself an exposition of Japan's management and re-
sponse to change. Nevertheless, it would be remiss to over-emphasis the elements of change with-
out highlighting the resilience and fortitude that enabled Japan to maintain its cultural heritage 
and traditions. The "heart and soul" of Japan had survived waves of modernization and Ameri-
canization. Consequently, contemporary Japan is a collage of modernity and tradition co-existing 
to form the backbone of its social and political tapestry. The delicate balance between change and 
continuity is, however, under stress. The age-old tussle between the forces of change and conserva-
tism continues to dominate the national agenda. This paper traces the evolution of Japanese grand 
strategy since the Meiji Restoration to the contemporary period and examines the main elements 
of change and continuity.
The Meiji and "Early Showa"2 Grand Strategy: Fukoku Kyohei 
     Meiji Japan faced immediate and long-term threats to its sovereignty. The immediate threat 
came in the form of the unequal trade treaties signed with Western powers. These treaties were 
considered an affront to Japanese political and economic integrity. Politically, it put Japan in an in-
ferior position as the Western powers obtained permission to establish missions with accompany-
ing extra-territorial rights within Japan, but these rights were not reciprocated. Furthermore, Japan 
had to institute low tariffs, affecting an influx of foreign goods and putting a strain on the economy 
through the outflow of gold. Thus, reversing the externalities of the trade treaties was a prime ob-
jective of Japanese foreign policy. With regard to the long-term threat, Japan was concerned with 
what could come its way if it failed to address the one-sided trade treaties. These treaties were seen 
as a Trojan horse that, if unchecked, would provide the Western powers an avenue to expand their 
influence in Japan on non-trade issues. Moreover, the relentless bombardment of Kagoshima, the 
Satsuma capital, in September 1863 by British warships provided additional impetus for Japan 
to rethink its relations with the West. It was in these contexts that fukoku kyohei emerged as the 
paradigmatic panacea for Japan's woes. 
     Fukoku kyohei is not an indigenous concept.' It was formed from four Chinese characters: 
fu (rich) koku (nation), kyo (strong) hei (army). According to Richard Samuels, this phrase can be 
traced to a Qin dynasty political leader and philosopher, Shang Yang, who counseled: "Governing 
a country lies in consolidating power; doing so [the ruler should] enrich the nation and strengthen 
1 The author acknowledges the generous support of the Japan Foundation for funding a dissertation fellow-
ship at Hitotsubashi University where the bulk of the research for this paper was conducted. 
2 This study divides the Showa reign into two conceptual periods. The "early" period covers 1912 to 1945, 
while the "late" Showa period stretches from 1945 to 1989. The Heisei period is from 1989 to the present. 
3 For a detailed analysis of the concept, see Samuels, 1994, pp. 34-42. 
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the army."4 In Japan, Mito scholar Aizawa Seishisai writing in Shinron (New Proposals) reformu-
lated the Chinese concept from a national development focus to one that highlighted the modalities 
of national survival. He explains: 
       In order to defend Japan, that is, to expel the barbarian (joi), it was necessary that the 
       country's ruling class be united through a structure of loyalty, of which the highest level 
       was loyalty to the emperor (sonno). Unity was also a condition for successfully promot-
       ing national wealth and strength: first, by restoring health to agriculture, so as to enrich 
       the country (fukoku); second, by reviving samurai discipline and morale, in order to in-
      crease military potential (kyohei).5 
Aizawa sought to galvanize the Japanese spirit and to revive bushido (way of the warrior) as a 
means to defend the nation from the flood of foreign influence. He believed that `ado's proper 
course was to issue a clarion call for war, even if it had no intention of acting on it."6 Furthermore, 
he adds that this was the only way "to preserve morale and offer resistance to the West."' Aizawa's 
unbending and confrontational stance against the West-very much like China's behavior in deal-
ing with the West-would have set Japan on a collision course with the Western powers. Fortu-
nately, his influence and that of his political thoughts waned in tandem with the political fortunes 
of his patron, Tokugawa Nariaki. 
     There were other adherents of fukoku kyohei8 besides Aizawa. One of its earliest proponents 
was Dazai Shundai who wrote in his Treatise on the Economy (Keizairoku) that "national wealth 
(fukoku) is the basis of national strength (kyohei) but that national welfare (literally `food and mon-
ey,' shokka) is the basis of national wealth."9 In a similar vein, Okubo Takusui, argued that `fukoku 
kyohei is the grand foundation, maintaining the world," while emphasizing "that the country would 
be in danger unless its wealth was assured."10 By the time the Meiji Restoration took root, fukoku 
kyohei was a topical subject among the elite searching for a new paradigm to guide Japan out of 
sakoku (isolationism) and into an internationalized community of nations. Yano Fumio captures 
the spirit and essence of fukoku kyohei in the following words: 
       If people are rich, the country is also rich; if people are poor, the country is also poor. If 
       army and navy are the body, national wealth is the food we consume.Without food, it is 
       impossible to maintain the body. In this situation, however independent a country may be, 
      the lack of wealth will extinguish it." 
Fukoku kyohei began as an abstract philosophical idea about the relations between wealth and 
power. Through time, it has evolved into an ideology that captured the hearts and imaginations 
of the Meiji oligarchs, who adopted it as their blueprint for political and economic reform in the 
post-Tokugawa period. 
    The base principles of fukoku kyohei-national wealth and military might-were widely 
held. "Except for a few recalcitrant loyalists, most political leaders and activists were committed 
to a policy of building a `rich country, strong army' (fukoku kyohei) in order to meet the Western
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challenge."" In contrast to Aizawa's exhortations, the Meiji reformers agreed that the catalyst for 
economic development and military modernization lies beyond the shores of Japan. The promi-
nent royalist and early internationalist, Sakuma Shozan "introduced the idea of combining foreign 
technology with Japanese values (toyo dotoku seiyo gijutsu) to strengthen the nation."" Sakurna's 
ideas gave rise to the concept of wakon yosai (Japanese spirit, Western technology), which made 
it politically palatable to adopt Western ideas without compromising Japanese values and culture. 
The Meiji oligarchs shrewdly concluded that peaceful relations with the West must be maintained 
at all costs until such times when Japan could adequately provide for its own defense.
The Grand Strategic Goals of Fukoku Kyohei 
    Fukoku kyohei, which literally means "rich nation, strong army," encompassed the broad 
policy imperatives of the Meiji government. The search for material wealth and the building of 
a powerful military were not, in themselves, the goals of the fukoku kyohei grand strategy. They 
were the organizing principles on which the grand strategy revolved. Fukoku kyohei consists of 
three grand strategic goals: (a) to regain and protect Japan's sovereignty, (b) the abolishment of 
unequal treaties, and (c) the pursuit of political and diplomatic equality with the West. The first two 
goals evolved out of Japan's instinctive will for national survival. In contrast, the goal of political 
and diplomatic equality with the West was incorporated into fukoku kyohei only after substantive 
progress was achieved.
Regaining Sovereignty 
     Sovereignty, as with all nations, was Japan's prime national objective. Nevertheless, at no 
point did Meiji Japan think that the West was attempting to colonize Japan. The perceived threat 
to sovereignty came in the form of "piecemeal imperialism." The Chinese loss of Hong Kong to 
Great Britain following the conclusion of the Anglo-Chinese War (1839-42) 14 greatly alarmed 
Japan of the possibility that the Western powers might sought to establish an autonomous foothold 
on Japanese soil. Thus, the main national objective of fukoku kyohei was to protect and enhance 
Japan's territorial sovereignty.
Abolish Unequal Treaties 
     The second objective of fukoku kyohei was for Japan to regain its foreign economic policy 
autonomy, which it had lost when signing the Harris treaty. This treaty set the parameters and con-
ditions of foreign trade that Japan could not unilaterally amend. Kenneth Pyle argues that "[f]rom 
1868 to 1894 the prime goal of Japanese foreign policy was revision of the unequal treaties, so as 
to stand on equal footing with the Western countries and escape the semi-colonial status to which 
extraterritoriality and tariff control had relegated Japan."" The goal was not to expel foreign trad-
ers or to revert to the Tokugawa sakoku policy but rather to bring about a new trading regime that 
was more equitable.
The Quest for Equality
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     The third grand strategic goal of fukoku kyohei was to achieve equality with the West. 
Equality, in contrast to the previous goals, was a subsequent addition to the framework of fukoku 
kyohei. It was not an immediate concern for the Meiji oligarchs. It is difficult to pinpoint when the 
quest for equality became part of the Meiji grand strategy. Nevertheless, one could consider the 
Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) an important point of departure that sparked Japan's crusade to seek 
equality with the Western powers. In the war, Japan was victorious and gained territorial control 
of Taiwan, the Liaodong Peninsula and the Pescadores islands through the Treaty of Shimonoseki 
(1895). Japan was appalled when France, Germany and Russia delivered an ultimatum demanding 
the return of the Liaodong Peninsula to China or risk war with the three powers. Reading out the 
collective demands of the three powers, the German minister to Tokyo, in a very strong statement, 
reminded the Japanese vice-minister for foreign affairs, Hayashi Tadasu, "Japan cannot defeat the 
united strength of Russia, France and Germany."16 This incident-known as the Triple Interven-
tion-reminded Japan of its second-class status and Japan begrudgingly returned the Liaodong 
Peninsula to ward off a military showdown. This incident impressed upon Japan that it had to 
achieve military parity with the West if it were to expect to play any role in international politics. 
Thus, began Japan's quest for political and diplomatic equality with the great powers. It follows 
that a by-product of equality is the attainment of great power status or acceptance of Japan as a 
"first-class" actor among the international community. 
     The grand strategic goals of sovereignty and the quest to abolish the unequal treaties are 
linked. The revision of the treaties would return policy autonomy to the Japanese government and 
would hence, enable the state to exercise its sovereign right to regulate trade. From a conceptual 
angle, however, the prime national objective of protecting Japan's sovereignty refers to the im-
perative of maintaining the nation's territorial integrity. On the other hand, the second national 
objective concerns the political and economic spheres where the Japanese government regains its 
policymaking autonomy. In short, the national objectives offukoku kyohei refers to the imperative 
of keeping Japanese territory from falling into Western control, and to efforts in abolishing the un-
equal trade treaties that would allow Japan to set its own terms and conditions on foreign trade.
The "Late Showa" Grand Strategy: The Yoshida Doctrine 
     The "Yoshida Doctrine" was named after Yoshida Shigeru who was prime minister from 
1946-7 and 1948-54. A diplomat by profession, Yoshida was one of the most influential politicians 
of postwar Japan. He successfully concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty that restored Japan's 
sovereignty. His vision, with a blend of pragmatism and realism, was a pivotal factor in Japan's 
reemergence as a great power. Nevertheless, it is ironic that for all the success associated with the 
doctrine, Yoshida chose to distance himself from his namesake. 17 Kenneth Pyle acknowledges that 
Yoshida had "never spoke of a 'Yoshida Doctrine."' Nevertheless, the doctrine became a defining 
factor in his long and illustrious political career. 
    The Yoshida doctrine gained wide currency and support. After Yoshida left office in 1954, 
his disciples-collectively known as the Yoshida gakko (school) at Nagatacho18 kept his legacy 
alive. Among the "honors students" of the school were Prime Ministers Ikeda Hayato (1960-64), 
Sato Eisaku (1964-72) and Miyazawa Kiichi (1991-93). Yoshida's influence on Japanese politics
16 Ibid. p. 138. 
17 For a detailed discussion on the genesis and use of the concept, see Pyle, 1996, pp. 25-26 
18 Nagatacho is the seat of Japan's political power where the national assembly-the Diet-is located.
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was unquestioned. Over the years, succeeding administrations had fine-tuned the doctrine to reflect 
the exigencies of the moment with the inclusion of notable corollaries such as the non-nuclear 
policy and the ban on weapons export. Critics like Nakasone Yasuhiro found their efforts to rearm 
and expand Japan's international security commitment dashed by the entrenched doctrine. 
     The three tenets of the Yoshida doctrine are as follows: 
      (a) Japan's economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political-economic 
          cooperation with the United States was necessary for this purpose. 
      (b) Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-
          strategic issues. Not only would this low posture free the energies of its people for 
         productive industrial development, it would avoid divisive internal struggles. 
      (c) To gain a long-term guarantee for its own security, Japan would provide bases for the 
           U.S. army, navy and air force.' 9 
This paper reformulates the Yoshida doctrine into two grand strategic goals: economic recovery/ 
growth and minimal defense.
Grand Strategic Goals of the Yoshida Doctrine 
    Following the diplomatic ceremonies associated with the surrender to the Allied Forces, 
Japanese leaders had to grapple with the realities of rebuilding a war-torn nation and to soothe the 
souls of a society marred by deprivation and suffering. The immediate challenge for Japan was 
less an issue of regaining its power and status in the international community, but more toward the 
mundane concerns of clothing, feeding and securing its citizens. It was these ends that the grand 
strategic goals of the Yoshida doctrine sought to achieve."
Economic Reconstruction and Growth 
     The prime focus of the Yoshida doctrine was economics. In the first years of the postwar 
period, Japan was surviving from hand to mouth from the benevolence of the U.S. which provided 
vast amounts of food and monetary aid. The resources of the state were also taxed by the burden 
of having to provide for the six million troops and civilians returning from Asia. Jobs needed to be 
found for them, as well as the other seven million unemployed citizens. This put tremendous social 
and political pressure on the government. The solution to these woes was economic reconstruction. 
Other than the obvious benefits of creating new jobs and to shore up Japan's fiscal standing, eco-
nomic reconstruction was a positive diversion that channeled the nation's energies to productive 
endeavors.
19 Pyle 1996b, p. 235. 
20 The preservation of the national polity (kokutai)-read the Imperial system-was a major political goal 
in the closing stages of WWII. There were indications that the Japanese government prolonged the war by 
months because national leaders read the Potsdam Declaration as a threat to the Imperial Throne. Thus, the 
governing elite breathed a sigh of relief when MacArthur agreed to maintain the monarchy system and did 
not charge the Emperor for war crimes. In an attempt to defuse criticisms of the Emperor from the Allied 
powers, Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro "arranged for the emperor to issue a New Year's statement deny-
ing divine attributes" (Reischauer 1977, p. 378). The "humanization" of the Emperor was enshrined in the 
new constitution promulgated on November 3, 1946. Article I declares the Emperor's role as symbolic and 
affirms sovereign power resides with the people. The Emperor, whose lineage dates back to the sixth cen-
tury BC, commands high respect among the Japanese people and remains an important national institution 
but wields limited political influence compared to past monarchs under the Meiji constitution.
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     There were two facets to the economic goals of the Yoshida doctrine grand strategy: recov-
ery and growth. The focus on economic recovery refers to, on the one hand, efforts directed toward 
rebuilding the nation's infrastructure and support facilities, and to policies initiated to reestablish 
Japan's industrial and manufacturing capacities on the other. Japan's vast military-industrial com-
plex was also retooled for civilian production. From a political angle, recovery meant achieving 
and surpassing the pre-war economic achievements. In 1956, the government published its Eco-
nomic White Paper declaring, "It is no longer postwar." In fact, "by 1955 most key economic 
indicators had already risen higher than prewar levels. Real GNP had accomplished this in 1951 
and per capita GNP by 1955. Real per capita consumption returned to prewar levels in 1953...."21 
When the goals of economic recovery were attained in 1955, the focus shifted to growth and de-
velopment. While this objective was no different from other nations, Japan's single-mindedness 
set it apart from the norm.
Minimal Defense 
    The second goal of the Yoshida doctrine was to keep Japan as a lightly armed nation. This 
rationale was the result of the convergence of several factors. The first of two important factors is 
the age-old "guns and butter" debate. Japan surmised that "guns" were a waste of resources and 
opted to focus on economic development. The second factor concerns Japan's war legacy. Memo-
ries of WWII made it difficult for Japan to undertake full-scale rearmament. The constant cries of 
Japanese revival of militarism from Beijing and Seoul, and strong domestic pacifist sentiments 
worked in tandem to keep Japanese remilitarization in check. These two factors helped shaped the 
discourse on security and defense issues in Japan, contributing to the institutionalization of the 
"minimal defense" posture. Th  goal of "minimal defense" was to keep Japan's defense expendi-
ture to the lowest level without compromising the nation's security. In summary, the net result of 
the Yoshida doctrine grand strategy was to harness the nation's resources toward economic growth 
while maintaining a defense structure that is cost-effective and non-threatening in nature (i.e., 
defensive posture).
The Heisei Grand Strategy: The Koizumi Doctrine 
     The Koizumi doctrine-named after the Japanese premier-is a new diplomatic initiative 
but encompasses strands of ideas that were widely held in Japan since the 1990s. The doctrine, 
christened by the premier's aides, is based on Koizumi Jun'ichiro's January 14, 2002 speech in 
Singapore. In his address entitled, "Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partner-
ship," Koizumi outlined the importance of cooperation between Japan and ASEAN, and reiterated 
his government's commitment to further Japan's ties with the region based on the Fukuda Doc-
trine. Continuing his mentor's legacy, Koizumi stated that "Japan and ASEAN should strengthen 
their cooperation under the basic concept of `acting together, advancing together. "'22 He also pro-
posed closer security cooperation noting that Japan "realizes that one's own security is at stake 
when a neighbor's wall is ablaze."23 Underlining his commitment to economic reform at home and 
the inescapable phenomenon of economic interdependence, Koizumi noted that "when it comes to
21 Uchino 1983, p. 83. 
22 Koizumi 2002. 
23 Ibid.
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the global economy, rain does not fall on one roof alone."24 
     The Koizumi doctrine breaks new ground in that it is less "insular" in its orientation. In con-
trast to the Yoshida doctrine's domestic focus that puts national development and growth above all 
other considerations, the new doctrine stakes Japan's future with its neighbors. This shift compels 
Tokyo to take on an active regional, if not global role. Japan realizes that as a trading nation, its 
boundaries extend beyond its shores. The Koizumi doctrine revolves around three grand strategic 
goals. The first goal centers on institutionalizing Japan's position in the international system by 
transforming its economic influence into structural power. The second goal of "national tranquil-
ity" serves to ensure social stability in the wake of reforms and change. The last strategic goal-
maintaining "economic distance"-focuses on Japanese efforts to preserve their technological 
edge vis-a-vis their competitors in order to sustain Japan's competitive edge.
Grand Strategic Goals of the Koizumi Doctrine 
The Quest for Structural Power 
     Japan's economic power is respected and feared. But Japan's presence in the international 
system is muted as it behaves, in the words of Funabashi Yoichi, "like an automatic teller machine 
(ATM)." A former high ranking International Monetary Fund (IMF) official commented that he 
has "never seen Japan speak up before others do. Even when Japan did, it was simply in support 
of a majority opinion."25 This observation is attributed, in part, to Japan's "non-confrontational 
culture," but closer examination would reveal an endemic weakness in structural power. Susan 
Strange defines this concept as "the power to decide how things shall be done, [and] the power 
to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other. ..."26 Structural power could be at-
tained through several means. One way is to diversify Japan's power base in light of Joseph Nye's 
contention that "[t]he fragmented structure of world politics among different issues has made 
power resources less fungible."27 Thus, it is important to possess an array of capabilities to respond 
effectively to any contingencies. Second, structural power results through the exercise of "power 
conversion capabilities."28 
     If Japan aspires for a more participatory and visible role in international affairs, it needs to 
boost its personnel commitment to international organizations. There is an acute shortage of Japa-
nese international civil servants. For example, Japan has 112 professional staffers in the UN, well 
short of the "desirable range" of 251-339 recommended by that body.29 With the notable exception 
of Akashi Yasushi, Matsuura Koichiro, Nakajima Hiroshi and Ogata Sadako,30 there are few Japa-
24 Ibid. 
25 Pyle 1996a, p. 66. 
26 Strange 1994, p. 25. 
27 Nye 1990, p. 189. 
28 Nye defines "power conversion capabilities as the "gap between a country's potential power-measured 
by its resources-and its actual or realized power." (Ibid. p. 198.) 
29 Asahi Shimbun 2005, p. 60. Figures are for June 2003. 
30 Akashi served as UN special representative for Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, and Under-Sec-
retary General for the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Matsuura was director-general of the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Nakajima headed the World Health 
Organization (WHO), while Ogata was UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This list does not 
include past and present presidents of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), who by tradition is always a 
Japanese. The other notable Japanese international servant is Owada Hisashi, who is currently a judge at the
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nese nationals at the helm of international organizations. The low participatory rate of Japanese 
nationals in the UN holding professional and leadership positions amplifies Japan's reputation of 
"invisibility" on the international stage
, and constitutes a serious impediment to achieving struc-
tural power. 
     The problem of power conversion is not limited to the area of human resources but is also 
institutional. Japan's 19.468 percent share" of the UN regular budget is higher than the combined 
total of all permanent members of the Security Council-except the U.S.-yet it does not have a 
seat on the world's highest international security body. Analysts like Reinhard Drifte observe that 
Japan's campaign for a permanent seat on the UNSC is fueled by "considerations of prestige."32 
Nevertheless, beneath Japan's penchant for recognition lies a deep-seated craving for structur-
al power. The president of the Gakushuin Women's College and former ambassador to the UN, 
Hatano Yoshio quips that "[n]o one will pay attention to you unless you speak your mind as a 
permanent council member."33 Koizumi underlined the importance of structural power by renew-
ing Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council at the Fifty-Ninth Session of 
the General Assembly." Japan is also "structurally weak" in the IMF: its allotted quota under the 
eleventh review of 6.279 percent falls short of the "calculated quota" of 10.204 percent." Encour-
aging more Japanese to become international servants would increase Japan's physical presence 
internationally, while enhancing its electoral power in key international institutions gives Japan 
greater access and influence in decision-making. Both elements are important toward the goal of 
structural power. 
     Many analysts, including Edward Newman, associate Japan's weak international leader-
ship with its inability to "readily mobilize a substantial military force with global reach...."36 
This, however, is changing. The Koizumi administration moved to improve Japan's battered im-
age in the wake of the Gulf War debacle by acting swiftly and unequivocally to "show the flag." 
Heightening the SDF's visibility is an indicator that Japan is moving away from its unidimensional 
mold. Recalling his experience in the Gulf War, Ambassador Hatano recounted that despite Japan's 
substantial financial contribution to the war effort, he "was not permitted to attend unofficial [em-
International Court of Justice. 
31 The assessment rate is revised every three years. The current rate applies from 2004 to 2006. Japan 
has announced that it would seek to "revise the methodology used to calculate assessment rates to create a 
fairer system that reflects the true economic strength, and responsibility within the United Nations, of every 
Member State." (Permanent Mission of Japan to the United States.) 
32 Drifte 1998, p. 137. 
33 Daily Yomiuri 2003. 
34 In contrast to Japan's past bids, the 2004 Koizumi initiative was part of a "joint" effort that included 
Brazil, Germany and India. Although Japan enjoys immense support and popularity in the UN, having been 
elected to the UNSC as a rotating member the most number of times (1958, 1966, 1971, 1975, 1981, 1987, 
1992 and 1997), reactions to its ambitions for permanent membership are mixed. The U.S. had consistently 
been very supportive of Japan's efforts but reactions from China and the two Koreas are lukewarm at best. 
For the full text of Koizumi's UN speech, see Koizumi, Jun'ichiro, "A New United Nations for the New 
Era," Address delivered at the Fifty-ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New 
York, September 21, 2004(Prime Minister's Office). 
35 Rapkin and Strand 2003, p. 20. (Size of quota matters because they determine the voting power in the 
IMF.) 
36 Newman 2000, p. 59.
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phasis added] Security Council meetings on the war."37 Similarly, Japan was often sidelined in G-7 
summits in deliberations on international security. Japan was snubbed because of its self-declared 
"international military exemption." Hence, allowing the SDF to undertake limited security roles 
would likely improve Japan's standing and enhance its structural power. Yamamoto Takehiko of 
Waseda University also raises the specter of PKO as a "diplomatic card to get concessions from 
the U.S."38 
     If Japan can sustain the momentum in pulling its weight to perform security functions, 
coupled with its traditional financial generosity, there is no reason why Japan should not aspire 
and indeed, be accorded structural power commensurate with its commitment and resources. The 
motivation for structural power is not for national aggrandizement but rather a means to secure 
the long-term security and future of the nation. Nations such as France and the UK continue to 
enjoy international recognition well into their twilight years owing to their success in having insti-
tutionalized their positions in the international structure (i.e., the UN and IMF). As such the grand 
strategic goal of achieving structural power is a defensive measure against the imminent erosion of 
its relative economic power and to anchor Japan within the inner circle of global decision-making.
National Tranquility 
     Koizumi set the tone for reform by declaring that no sector is sacred and pleaded to the 
nation to endure pain in order for changes to be successful. When reform tsar, Takenaka Heizo 
announced that no bank is "too big to fail," it created a stir among those concerned about the cost 
of structural reform. After more than a decade of what Darren Whitten calls the "Heisei malaise," 
Japanese have come around to accepting change as inevitable. However, change is unsettling as 
it creates a new pool of winners and losers. The grand strategic goal of national tranquility puts 
paramount importance on ensuring societal stability in the wake of change and reform. 
    Japan is conflicted between the prospects of a declining standard of living and opening its 
doors to foreigners to make up for its dwindling workforce. The migrant labor issue generates 
passionate debate centering on the threat posed by foreigners to the nation's "cultural purity" and 
cohesion. In an age where human resources are increasingly mobile, Japan could not afford to be 
xenophobic. Post-industrial economies rely on the fermentation of ideas and knowledge to grow, 
and thus slamming the door on immigration is a setback for the economy. It is, thus, in the nation's 
best interest to embrace the issue of diversity in a positive and welcoming manner. The ability 
of Japanese society to coexist with other nationals and cultures is central to the preservation of 
national tranquility. 
     Reform is destabilizing, even more so when the cost is borne disproportionately by different 
segments of society. Reforming the national curriculum affects the society in ways that tests exist-
ing norms and traditions to the limits. Although the object of the new curriculum is to maintain 
and further Japan's achievements in critical subjects such as science and mathematics, as well as 
to produce individuals fitting Fukushima Sakie's model of "global executives," the ramifications 
of these reforms are more pronounced. The new national curriculum encourages individuality and 
personal achievement, pitting it against the long-held norms of consensus and collective interest. 
This gives rise to new patterns of social relations that would, among others, transform interper-
sonal ties, industrial and labor relations. 
     Reforms are seldom pain-free. Rationalization programs by industrial giants such as Nissan,
37 
38
Daily Yomiuri 2003. 
Takehiko Yamamoto, with author, tape recording, Tokyo, Japan, December 10, 2001.
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Fujitsu and Sony have been successful in returning these corporate giants to profitability, but they 
have also helped push the unemployment rate to post-war highs. Sony's Transformation 60 revi-
talization strategy, for example, would shed 20,000 jobs by 2006. The pace and extent of reforms 
in the fifteen years of the Heisei period is unparalleled except for two epochal events in modern 
Japanese history-the Meiji Restoration and the U.S. Occupation. If reforms are implemented 
without putting in place safety nets to cushion the externalities of change, social harmony and sta-
bility might be in peril. National tranquility goes beyond pulling disparate groups to live and work 
together in harmony and involves creating the economic, political and social space for stakehold-
ers to function effectively. In the end, the goal of national tranquility centers on the issue of how to 
manage change in a society with a stoic reputation for conservatism and risk-averse preferences.
Maintaining Economic Distance 
     Japanese firms producing a wide array of products ranging from trucks to electrical com-
ponents scattered throughout the region are important growth engines for their host nations. Mat-
sushita Electrical Co., for example, accounts for about five percent of Malaysia's GDP. Although 
Japan is undoubtedly the economic leader in the region, its position is by no means secure. A 2000 
RAND report argues that "Japan's relative economic power [...] in the region diminishes apprecia-
bly from 2000 to 2015, vis-a-vis both China and [South] Korea."39 The Chinese economy, buoyed 
by domestic capital spending and foreign investment, is expected to trot along its high growth tra-
jectory while Japan remains laggard. The expansion of the Chinese economy-with its relatively 
untapped market of more than one billion consumers and its new role as the world's factory-is 
a phenomenon not lost on the world. In fact, some members of the G-8 have spoken favorably of 
China's membership, which is in itself is a testament to the growing Chinese influence and power. 
Thus, the grand strategic goal of maintaining economic distance is a reaction against the relative 
decline of the Japanese economy, and aims to arrest the erosion of Japan's economic power. The 
following analogy by Tessa Morris-Suzuki captures the conceptual underpinnings of "economic 
distance":
       The evolution of economic relations between Japan and South-East Asia, in short, is not 
       so much a process in which the Asian `new Japans' are catching up with Japan itself, 
       but rather a process which may be pictured as resembling the movement of an escalator: 
       as South-East Asian economies moved first from agriculture to labor-intensive light-in-
       dustry, and later from light industry to more capital- and technology-intensive forms of 
       manufacturing, so the Japanese economy itself has shifted its own industrial and techno-
       logical frontiers forward, thus maintaining its economic dominance of the region." 
    Controlling the outflow of technology and industrial expertise allows Japanese firms to 
maintain their competitive edge and to perpetuate the divide between Japan and its neighbors. It is, 
however, harder to rely on "deprivation" to maintain economic distance. The gap between Japan 
and Asia-albeit substantial-is narrowing due to endogenous and exogenous factors." Thus, Ja-
39 Wolf et al. 2000, p. 65. This study using the indexing method pegs China's GDP (PPP) in 2015 at 1,672, 
South Korea at 225 and Japan at 488. These figures are indexed on South Korea's 2000 GDP forecast at 
$788 billion in PPP 1998 U.S. dollars. 
40 Morris-Suzuki 1991, p. 149. 
41 Endogenous factors, among other, refer to improved literacy rates and greater accessibility to technical 
and higher education. Exogenous factors include (a) increased FDI and international cooperation, and (b) 
reverse brain drain.
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pan has to take proactive steps to stay ahead. Reforms already underway in the education system 
had an eye toward maintaining Japan as a technological superpower. After decades of deliberation 
and stalling, Japan has taken crucial steps to remedy its structural weaknesses. Joint research be-
tween university and industry researchers-which had been traditionally low-is on the rise. The 
number of cases of joint research rose appreciably from 705 in FYI 989 to 5,264 in FY2001.42 Edu-
cation reform builds on Japan's high scholastic achievements while simultaneously preparing the 
products of the system to be more effective in trans-national activities. Researchers, engineers and 
scientists with a global outlook as well as the linguistic ability are indispensable assets to enhance 
Japan's technological competitiveness. It is no accident that the Toyota Formula One racing team 
is based in France to accrue synergistic benefits of working with European engineers and crew. 
    Japan's niche in the international system is its ability to produce innovative and high quality 
products. In the words of Kosaka Masataka, Japan "live[s] by purchasing primary products and 
semi-finished products and processing them." In other words, Japan "live[s] by utilizing other peo-
ple's production."43 What made Japan the economic superpower that it is today was its engineering 
superiority, i.e., the ability to produce quality goods at competitive prices. Thus, technology itself 
is a priceless resource. The future of Japan depends, immeasurably, on its ability to maintain and 
further its technological edge.
Change and Continuity in Japanese Grand Strategy 
    The Meiji Restoration and the events following the "birth" of modern Japan was one of the 
most successful social, economic and political changes of its time. Ninety years later, Japan would 
again transform itself. Only this time, the Imperial Japanese Navy ensign was nowhere to be seen, 
and in its place were the ubiquitous Sony, Toyota, Panasonic, NEC and Fuji neon signs. The Heisei 
period marks the third time in modern Japanese history where conditions were ripe for change. 
From Meiji to Heisei, the Japanese had demonstrated "bamboo-like" characteristics-strong but at 
the same time, nimble to bend to the prevailing winds. This section presents a comparative discus-
sion of the Koizumi doctrine and Japan's past grand strategies. It highlights elements of change 
and continuity. The most visible departures of the Koizumi doctrine from its immediate predeces-
sor (the Yoshida doctrine) are (a) Japan's increasingly visible and high profile in global affairs, 
(b) the "rehabilitation" of military power, and (c) Japan's drive toward attaining structural power. 
These changes are, however, tempered by the endurance of (a) ambivalent internationalization, (b) 
dependency on the outside world, and (c) Japan's struggle with identity.
ELEMENTS OF CHANGE 
     To posit that Japan is undergoing change is almost a cliche. Koizumi's opponents attack 
the prime minister for dragging his foot at substantive change. They argue that Koizumi's reform 
program is superficial and tantamount to "one step forward, two steps back." There is also a school 
of thought that Japan's current economic rebound took place precisely because Koizumi failed to 
deliver on his reform pledges. Nevertheless, there is no denying that Koizumi is presiding over 
the most robust growth in more than a decade. Japan's rebound, however, originated in the board-
rooms of Japan's multinationals. This is not surprising considering the interests tied to the export 
economy has traditionally been Japan's most innovative and far-sighted. Koizumi's imprints in
42 MEXT 2003. 
43 Pyle 1998, p. 266.
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other fields were, nevertheless, more visible and productive. Just as Yoshida did in his time, Koi-
zumi re-wrote Japan's foreign policy playbook by increasing the nation's visibility on the world 
stage, and by taking the political plunge to "rehabilitate" the SDF and make it an integral part of 
foreign policy. The grand strategic focus of the Heisei period is also notable for its efforts to ex-
pand Japan's power beyond economics.
High Profile/Visibility 
     Japan's increasingly prominent international political-strategic profile is a new development 
as Japan previously hid behind its constitutional shield and public opinion. Koizumi, however, suc-
cessfully cajoled the nation to abandon its myopic worldview and nudged a skeptical nation to join 
the "coalition of the willing." This move was far from popular and was opposed by sectors within 
and outside the premier's party. The March 2004 kidnapping of three Japanese nationals by anti-
U.S. forces in Iraq highlighted the dangers of this policy shift. Critics argued that the SDF's Sa-
mawah (Iraq) deployment made Japan a target for terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda's 500 grams of gold 
bounty offer for every Japanese national killed in Iraq raises the specter of Tokyo's re-initiation 
into the world of power politics.44 Having been described by al-Qaeda as an "enemy" was shocking 
to say the least, and is contrary to Japan's penchant to be well-liked by everyone. Nevertheless, as 
the chairman of Mitsubishi Corp. Makihara Minoru explains, "[t]o overcome global barriers and 
engender trust, one cannot remain faceless."45 Koizumi's rejection of the kidnappers' demand to 
withdraw the SDF from Iraq was an affirmation of Japan's resolve and commitment to interna-
tional causes. It demonstrated that Japan was ready to step out of its "political pygmy" shadow and 
its willingness to take active and direct steps toward the maintenance of the international order.
Rehabilitating Military Power 
     The most radical departure of the Koizumi doctrine grand strategy was the "de-tabooliza-
tion" of security issues. Hitherto, military issues had been taboo, while the Japan Defense Agency 
(JDA) was regarded as a political backwater. Under the Yoshida doctrine, the government success-
fully shrouded the Self-Defense Force's (SDF) war fighting capabilities, and instead marketed the 
SDF as a disaster relief outfit. This charade was part of the larger design to harmonize the SDF with 
the constitution's pacifist spirit. The end of the Cold War and the September 11 terrorist attacks 
changed Japan's security vision. Security policy was openly debated and resumed its rightful place 
on the national agenda. The launch of Japan's first spy satellite, the Anti-Terrorism Law and its 
anti-missile defense program were manifestations of a society coming to grips with the precarious 
nature of international politics. This does not mean, however, the abandonment of pacifism, which 
continues to enjoy wide appeal in contemporary Japan. What it does show is that the idealism of 
one-country pacifism46 is now tempered with a touch of pragmatism. Japan's changing strategic 
outlook, coupled with the erosion of pacifism enabled the Hashimoto and Koizumi administrations 
to reexamine Japan's strategic posture. These reviews resulted in assigning a new mission-peace-
keeping-for the SDF, which indirectly lowers the threshold for Japan to participate in limited
44 The placement of the bounty was purportedly made by al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on May 6, 
2004. Al-Qaeda also made an offer for the "head" of UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, US top military 
officials in Iraq and Italian nationals. 
45 Ito 2002. 
46 Defined by Susumu Takahashi as "the policy of simply acting in order to keep Japan's own peace, with-
out taking action in order to promote international peace." (Takahashi 2001, p. 32.)
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overseas missions. It is clear that the SDF had been rehabilitated and regained some of its legiti-
macy as a policy option.
The "New Agenda for Power" 
    Japan had been floundering in trying to find its niche in global leadership. It takes pride in 
furthering the non-proliferation agenda but appears unwilling to go beyond rhetoric to contain the 
spread of nuclear weapons. Former premier Hosokawa Morihiro's proposal to turn Japan into a 
cultural power47 has merits. Analysts point to Japan's "gross national cool" (GNC) as an indication 
of its emergence as a "cultural superpower."48 The popularity of Hello Kitty, Ultraman and Poke-
mon should not be, however, taken as the bellwether of the global embrace of Japanese culture. 
The notion of Japan as a cultural power is problematic. Samuel Huntington explains: "[Japanese] 
culture is highly particularistic and does not involve a potentially universal religion (Christianity, 
Islam) or ideology (liberalism, communism) that could be exported to other societies."49 Japanese 
culture lacks the global appeal of its American or French counterpart. Although the search for Ja-
pan's identity in the world continues and its soft power grows," priority is on institutionalizing its 
material power. In other words, Japan is shifting its focus from economic growth toward convert-
ing its economic power into forms of structural power that would bestow upon Japan a larger voice 
in international affairs. Japan's persistent hope for the coveted UNSC permanent seat demonstrates 
its desire for structural power in the emerging Japanese grand strategy.
ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY 
     From Meiji to Showa to Heisei, grand strategies were proxies on how Japan defined, reacted 
to and managed change. They were also a barometer on how Japan saw itself and the world. The 
image of a swaying bamboo represents Japan's adaptability and political acumen to the changing 
times, while its ability to withstand strong winds is indicative of its strength. Similarly, although 
the goals of grand strategy change from one incarnation to another, there were some constant 
fundamentals. One such constant is Japan's ambivalence toward internationalization. It seems to 
be caught between, on the one hand, the longing to embrace the world, and a sense of uniqueness 
bordering xenophobia on the other. Second, Japan's sense of dependency-politically and eco-
nomically-had been a marked feature of its modern history. The third element of continuity in 
Japanese grand strategy is Japan's struggle to "locate" itself in Asia. It has a tendency to vacillate 
between an Asian and Western identity.
Ambivalent Internationalization 
     Japan is ambivalent toward the outside world. In pre-Meiji times, the Bakufu's sakoku poli-
cy kept Japan's contact with foreigners to a minimum. Trade was tightly regulated and controlled. 
Strict laws governing the size and construction of sea-going vessels kept Japanese maritime ac-
tivities to littoral areas. The "bamboo curtain" was subsequently removed by the Meiji oligarchs 
who set Japan on a course to embrace all things western. This pattern of rejection and acceptance 
was repeated in the twentieth century. The fukoku kyohei grand strategy transformed Japan into 
a "western" nation and the militarization of the Greater Co-prosperity Sphere saw the expansion
47 Hosokawa 1993, p. 6. 
48 McGray 2002. See also, Frederick 2003. 
49 Huntington 1997, p. 137. 
50 Kojima 2003, pp. 3-10.
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of Japanese power throughout the region. In contrast, after Japan's defeat in WWII, the Yoshida 
doctrine of the late Showa period saw Japan limit its external relations and focus all its energies 
on the domestic agenda. 
     Nothing exposes Japan's sense of ambivalence more than the "internationalization" pro-
gram. The internationalization agenda sought to change and broaden the Japanese mindset so that, 
among others, they could function effectively in multicultural settings and to be more accepting of 
foreigners in their midst. While efforts were taken to make Japan more inviting and comfortable 
for foreign workers, the Tokyo Immigration Bureau launched a campaign to invite Tokyo resi-
dents to spy and report on their foreign neighbors. This McCarthy-like action reveals the Japanese 
psyche toward migrant labor: we need them but we do not like or trust them. This ambivalence 
had characterized Japanese grand strategy since the Tokugawa period. Japanese grand strategy, in 
large measure, had been a struggle to strike a balance between the need to engage the world and to 
insulate Japan from such engagements. 
Dependency 
    The Meiji Restoration in 1868 was a revolutionary event. Among other changes, the Meiji 
oligarchs diversified the economy, branching into manufacturing and industrial production. Sectors 
such as steel production that had military applications were particularly favored and obtained state 
patronage. This shift was significant because it marked the end of autarky, plunging Japan into a 
state of dependency that had since shadowed the Japanese economy. Modernization efforts also led 
Meiji Japan to rely on western expertise and technology. As the foreign o yatoi and enterprising lo-
cals helped lay the groundwork that would make Japan an industrial powerhouse in the late Showa 
period, it became apparent that Japan's demand for raw materials and energy supplies outstripped 
domestic supply. Being resource poor, Japan turned to imports to keep its factories in operation. In 
fact, Showa imperialism was, to a large degree, driven by the need to secure raw materials. This 
state of dependency continued into the Heisei period. For example, Japan imported 83.7 percent 
of its energy supplies, with crude oil accounting for 40.5 percent in the FY2003.51 Meanwhile, the 
nation's food self-sufficiency ratio continues to decline in tandem with the diminishing farming 
community. Currently, the Japanese rely on imports for sixty percent of their calorie intake. 
     The state of dependency extends to other areas. Except for a 30-year lull (1922-51),52 Japan 
had some form of collaborative arrangement with an external power. The first such venture was the 
1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance, which lasted for twenty years before it was scrapped in accordance 
to the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty. Japan, then, formalized its second alliance relationship in 
1951 with the signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. These alliances provided Japan with im-
mense political and strategic benefits. The British refusal-citing its alliance with Japan-to allow 
the Russian fleet to use the Suez Canal in the run up to the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese war delayed 
the arrival of the Russian fleet, giving the Japanese additional time to solidify their preparations. 
It also stretched Russian resources to the limit as its fleet had to endure additional months of navi-
gating around the African coast. At the same time, the alliance nullified British threats to Japan. 
The second alliance with the U.S. in the postwar years allowed Japan to concentrate on economic 
growth under the protective aegis of U.S. military power. In addition, the U.S. provided political
51 Asahi Shimbun 2006, p. 174. 
52 Japan formed the Axis alliance with Germany (1936). Italy joined the pact in 1937. The Axis pact was 
borne out of strategic convenience and effectively carved out a sphere of influence among the parties, al-
lowing Japan unimpeded freedom in Asia. There was little coordination or strategic collusion between the 
members.
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patronage, enabling Japan to rejoin the international community and hasten its rehabilitation. The 
compulsion to seek out alliances with a stronger party is an inherent characteristic in Japanese 
grand strategy. Japan had also shown its discriminating "taste" in selecting potential allies. It was 
not a coincidence that the "chosen" partners happened to be the hegemonic power of the day. Thus, 
whether by design or happenstance, Japan is highly dependent on the good graces of external ac-
tors to keep the nation as a viable social, economic and political entity.
The Struggle for Identity 
     Japan is a nation with "two faces." It has more in common with the West than with the 
developing countries of East Asia. Judging from the material and development divide between 
Japan and the rest of Asia," it is safe to assert that Japan is a "Western" country which happens to 
be geographically located in Asia. In the early days of modern Japan, Fukuzawa Yukichi had ear-
nestly argued for Japan to shed its Asian ways to embrace all things western. In this regard, Japan 
had succeeded beyond Fukuzawa's imagination and became the bastion of westernization in Asia. 
However, try as it may, Japan could not shed its Asian roots, as Japan does not fall within the nor-
mal acceptance of what it means to be Occidental. For example, notwithstanding Japan's meteoric 
rise in economic rankings over the last sixty years, no Japanese national was ever nominated, much 
less served as the chairman of the World Bank or the IMF. 
     Nevertheless, Japan has belatedly come around to accepting its Asian identity. "Japan's 
embrace of [its] East Asian identity can be seen in Miyazawa attempting to give the 1993 Tokyo 
G-7 Summit an East Asian feel by announcing an official tour of Southeast Asia"54 to solicit views 
from the region. The watashiyaku (bridging role) policy was an important diplomatic initiative 
to deepen regional ties. However, it is questionable to what extent East Asia accepts Japan as its 
spokesperson. There are several forums, namely APEC, ARF, ASEM and ASEAN+3, where mem-
bers of the region could directly engage G-7 members. Furthermore, China would certainly object 
to Tokyo speaking on its behalf. In sum, Japan is "Asian" in the geographical and cultural sense, 
but "Western" in terms of its developmental status and economic achievements. Throughout its 
modern history, Japan has vacillated between the West and Asia. Under the fukoku kyohei grand 
strategy, Japan literally abandoned Asia and embraced westernization in earnest, while in the late 
Showa and Heisei periods, it sought to "return to Asia." Having come full circle, Japan finds itself 
in an awkward position of not gaining full acceptance by either side. Huntington, in his penetrating 
analysis, categorized Japan as a "lone country." This "loneliness" stems not only from the cultural 
elements but politically as well. The search to (re)define the nation had been an underlining feature 
of Japanese grand strategies in the last two millennia, and had resulted in contemporary Japan hav-
ing to deal with the twin burdens of simultaneously being western and Asian.
Conclusion
    Studying the Meiji and Showa grand strategies was easier with the benefit of hindsight. In 
contrast, understanding the Heisei grand strategy was a more complex and daunting undertaking
53 With the exception of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. 
54 Hook et al. 2001, p. 355.
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due to the fact that it is still evolving. Japan is at a unique juncture in history. The Japanese are 
prone to accept the conditions in which they operate as a given. There is wisdom in this fatalistic 
worldview considering that the bifurcated situation during the Showa era allowed Japan little ma-
neuvering room and few options. This changed as the "end of history" liberated Japan from ideo-
logical and political constraints, allowing Tokyo a greater degree of freedom to pursue its national 
interests. Although Japan has the wherewithal to influence and condition the external environment, 
it opted for the cooperative approach of "acting together, advancing together." This vision, laden 
with undertones of inclusiveness and partnership, is a masterstroke as it addresses Japan's current 
and future strategic interests. Its immediate goal to legitimize Japanese regional leadership and 
establishing cooperative linkages among regional members is a prelude to keeping China from 
establishing regional hegemony. In sum, the Koizumi doctrine is a grand strategy for the present 
and has a firm eye on the future. However, the uncertainties surrounding Japan's domestic political 
stability and regional balance of power suggest that the years ahead will be fraught with challenges 
and opportunities. This highlights the dominant theme in Japanese grand strategies since the Meiji 
era which deals with Japan's management and response to change.
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